PatrickLancaster
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SCOTT RITTER : Gonzalo Lira, the SBU, and Information Operations
An Investigation of the Probable
August 09, 2023
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Gonzalo Lira

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Gonzalo Lira, the well-known Chilean-American YouTube personality, has been in the news lately. A former “lifestyle” coach, Lira re-branded himself as a geopolitical commentator in the leadup to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, providing gripping first-hand observations—often critical of the Ukrainian government and contradictory of the Ukrainian narrative—that were posted on YouTube. As his popularity grew, his social media footprint expanded, with his Twitter and Telegram accounts garnering tens of thousands of followers, and his YouTube videos garnering hundreds of thousands of views and subscribers.

Gonzalo Lira was arrested by the SBU, or Ukrainian intelligence service, on April 15, 2022, and released five days later. Lira has been circumspect about both the arrest and the conditions of his release—he blithely calls it his “missing week.” Lira does acknowledge that his computers and phone were seized by Ukrainian authorities, and that he was released under conditions of “house arrest,” implying some sort of continued monitoring and control of his activities by the SBU. Nonetheless, he was able to gain access to a computer, set up a new email account, and immediately begin posting information critical of the Ukrainian government.

Alex Christoforou, of The Duran, interviews Gonzalo Lira after his release from SBU custody, April 22, 2022

There is only one logical explanation for this chain of events. Gonzalo Lira was arrested by the SBU for crimes he himself admits gets people arrested, tortured, and murdered. He is released five days later—unharmed—and immediately allowed to resume the exact same activity that led to arrest in the first place, only this time on a computer and email account controlled by the SBU.

This is a classic “catch and release” scenario, with Gonzalo Lira playing the role of “police confidential informant”—someone who provides information in exchange for lenient treatment. There literally is no other plausible explanation for what happened other than this.

And yet controversy swirls around the saga surrounding Lira’s arrest and release, as well as his subsequent actions, including his re-arrest in May 2023, his re-release on July 6, and a series of bizarre videos and tweets made by Gonzalo on July 31, released while he waited at the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, awaiting his attempt to “escape” Ukrainian custody, all the while broadcasting his intent for all the world—and the SBU—to see. According to charging documents published by the Kharkov prosecutor overseeing Lira’s case, the former lifestyle coach failed in his attempt, and is once more in the custody of the SBU awaiting trial.

Many people, including those with whom Lira had interacted with and befriended over the course of the past two years, have rallied in his support, taking umbrage—often extreme—at my contention that Lira has been, ever since his arrest in April 2022, an asset of the SBU.

Under normal circumstances, I might make common cause with these people, granting Lira the benefit of the doubt and arguing for his release and subsequent deportation from Ukraine, only addressing the anomalies and inconsistencies in his narrative once he is safely outside of Ukraine.

But these are not normal circumstances.

We are at war.

This applies to everyone reading these words, and everyone who doesn’t. The fact that a person neither accepts that he or she is a participant in this conflict, nor recognizes its existence, does not matter.

We are at war.

This conflict does not involve tanks, artillery, aircraft, bombs, bullets, drones, or bayonets.

It is a war of words, of ideas.

A Meeting of the Center for Countering Disinformation, April 2021

It is an information war, a battle of competing Russian and Ukrainian narratives fought on a global scale. The stakes are high; as Andrii Shapovalov, the acting head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD)—one of the frontline organizations involved in this war—recently noted in an address, “For them [Russia], as for us, this is a matter of life and death.”

Shapovalov’s words were spoken at a gathering of the National Cluster on Information Resistance, convened in Kiev on July 3, 2023. The National Cluster on Information Resistance is a group of experts and organizations that work together to counter disinformation and cyber threats in Ukraine, funded by the US Civil Research and Development Fund (Global), a private entity created by the US Congress whose presence in Ukraine was underwritten and supervised by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Bluntly stated, if you are a US citizen who holds a position counter to the official US government/Ukrainian narrative regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, you are being treated as a hostile combatant in the information war that has sprung up around this conflict, regardless of your constitutionally protected right to free speech.

And if you’re not American, you’re free game.

Just in case that point isn’t driven home strong enough, consider the following: The CCD, with the backing of the United States, has published a blacklist of persons—including many notable American citizens—of persons it has labeled as “information terrorists.” According to the CCD, it’s mission, carried out in conjunction with Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, is twofold. First, to combat information terrorism, and second, to coordinate this effort with international “partners.”

The CCD defines “information terrorism” as “a Crime against Humanity committed by means of instruments affecting the consciousness.” In short, anyone who exercises his or her right to free speech can be prosecuted as a “terrorist” in the full meaning of that term.

To drive that point home even more, the United States—Ukraine’s leading partner in this information war—kills terrorists preemptively, void of any notion of due process.

The CCD wants to mainstream this mindset on a global basis. “Having joined forces with the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and its international partners,” the CCD has declared, it “is taking the initiative to establish this term in international practice,” calling on the international community to “unite in the face of information terrorism.”

In this regard, the CDD makes four demands. First, that Russia be declared an “infoterrorist state,” and that “infoterrorism” must be equated with “actual terrorism,” requiring “appropriate measures to counter it.” Second, that anyone associated in any way with “infoterror” be treated as an “information terrorist.” This definition is all-inclusive—editors, writers, presenters, cameramen, bloggers, etc.

In short, anyone who is involved in the production of any information that runs counter to the Ukrainian narrative regarding the war with Russia is an “infoterrorist.” Third, the financing of “infoterrorism,” both “explicit” and “implicit,” should be banned by “both international and domestic law,” and those who are involved in such financing should be treated as “accomplices to information terrorists.” And finally, any individual, company, public organization, or legal entity which is involved in “infoterrorism” should be subjected to sanctions, using the US list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” as a model.

Anyone who has ever uttered or written a word that runs counter to the official Ukrainian narrative is, in the mind of Ukraine, an “infoterrorist.”

Ukraine is at war with “infoterrorists.”

As such, those practitioners of free speech who run afoul of Ukraine’s expansive definition of “infoterrorism” are combatants in this conflict, whether you want to be or not. And in war, the individual doesn’t matter. People are mere tools, to be deployed as needed, used, and discarded when no longer useful.

Chronologically, Lira’s arrest followed on the heels of the CCD’s publication of its mission statement regarding “infoterrorism.” There can be no doubt that Gonzalo Lira fell into the category of “infoterrorism” as far as Ukraine was concerned, as did anyone who collaborated with him.

This is a critical point that must be understood by anyone following Lira’s saga—in the eyes of the Ukrainians, he is an enemy combatant, not an individual with rights. He is a terrorist. Enemy combatants/terrorists are either eliminated or turned into a tool to be used to further the fight against “infoterrorists.”

When Gonzalo Lira was released by the SBU in April 2022, he was not the person he was when he had been arrested. That person was neutralized in Ukraine’s war on “infoterrorism.” Gonzalo Lira’s every move was, and is, controlled by the SBU to assist them in their larger information war against other “infoterrorists.”

If the many people who interacted with Gonzalo Lira, both before and after his April 2022 arrest, do not recognize this reality, then they are playing directly into the hands of the Ukrainian security services, because Gonzalo Lira is a Ukrainian weapon being used as part of a larger information operation being waged against everyone in the alternative media universe who produces content Ukraine might consider running counter to its goals and objectives in its conflict with Russia.

I don’t approach the topic of information warfare, or its derivative activity, information operations, lightly. In my time as an intelligence professional, both with the US Marine Corps and, later, with the United Nations, I was personally involved in information manipulation operations managed by US and UK intelligence services. One involved a joint CIA-CNN/Time collaboration, “The Inspector’s Story,” to produce a documentary which, according to the presenter, CNN’s own Bernard Shaw, used “the inspectors’ own stories told through interviews, documents, videotape and surveillance photographs” to “help explain why the United States and Britain threaten to bomb Iraq if inspections are not allowed to continue unimpeded.”

The timing of the release of the CNN/Time documentary was critical—I was scheduled to lead an inspection team into Iraq in the first week of March 1998 which was designed to provoke Iraq into blocking our work. The US government had deployed extensive military forces into the Persian Gulf and was prepared to use any evidence of Iraqi noncompliance to justify a military strike on Iraq. As Shaw noted, the documentary was designed to prepare an American audience for the need for military action against Iraq.

The collaboration between UNSCOM, the CIA, and CNN/Time wasn’t the only example of information operations designed to influence public opinion. The British government was concerned about the effectiveness of the Iraqi-Russian-French collaboration on shaping an anti-UNSCOM narrative and was keen on flipping the script back to a story line which emphasized Iraqi non-compliance with its disarmament obligation. In the Fall of 1997, I was approached by MI-6 regarding an information operation they were running known as “Operation MASS APPEAL.” MI-6 informed me that they had “connectivity” with highly-placed editors in major newspapers around the world in nations which had shown a proclivity for being swayed by the Iraqi-Russian-French story line.

What MI-6 proposed was for UNSCOM to provide it with intelligence reports we had gathered over the years from various sources which had not been of sufficient quality to “weaponize” into an on-site inspection. These reports were languishing in my safe until which time additional corroboration could be found. The problem was, most of these reports were dated, and even if corroboration could be had, we couldn’t justify an inspection on the grounds that the information lacked currency.

After getting approval from the UNSCOM Executive Chairman, Richard Butler, I passed onto MI-6 several reports which were then processed by MI-6 into “leads” that were leaked to newspapers in eastern Europe and South Asia, where they were turned into news reports that the British government could then use to bolster its case that Iraq was noncompliant with its disarmament obligation. I met with two MI-6 officers in London in June 1998 where we discussed expanding “Operation MASS APPEAL.” However, my resignation from UNSCOM in August 1998 brought this collaboration to an end.

Information warfare, and its derivative, information operations, are an ever-present reality in warfare. The Ukrainians, through the work of the CCD and it’s SBU-run cousin, the so-called “Myrotvorets kill list,” have taken the war on ideas to a whole new level. However, they are not without significant help from both the United States, which provides funding, training, and operational assistance, and the United Kingdom.

Jeremy Fleming, the Director of GCHQ, the British communications spy agency, has acknowledged that there is significant cooperation between his organization and their Ukrainian counterparts regarding information warfare. While neither Fleming nor the Ukrainians have discussed the details of this cooperation, leaked documents from the trove of material released by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013 provide critical insight into how GCHQ and, by extension, Ukraine approaches information operations in the digital age, and how someone like Gonzalo Lira could factor into such plans.

Within GCHQ is a special unit known as the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group, or JTRIG. Within the JTRIG is a more specialized team known as the Human Science Operations Cell, or HSOC. One of the mission statements of the JTRIG is to use “online techniques” to “make something happen in the real world.” This is done through the conduct of targeted information operations designed to influence and/or disrupt the target, something known in the “business” as “effect operations.”

The HSOC conducts active overt internet operations, including online human intelligence collection and effect operations. In the case of Ukraine, the aim of the HSOC and/or its Ukrainian counterpart team in the SBU would be to disrupt the dissemination of information deemed to be pro-Russian propaganda and/or disinformation, to discredit websites hosting such information along with the individuals and/or groups using them, to conduct online human intelligence collection, and to host pro-Russian sites in order to enable the collection of signals intelligence data.

The techniques used by HSOC and their Ukrainian counterparts could include the uploading of YouTube videos containing persuasive messages; establishing online aliases with Facebook, Telegram and Twitter accounts, blogs and forum memberships for conducting human intelligence or encouraging discussion on specific issues; establishing online aliases/personalities who support other aliases; sending spoof e-mails and text messages from a fake person or mimicking a real person; providing spoof online resources such as magazines and books that provide inaccurate information; providing online access to uncensored material; sending instant messages to specific individuals giving them instructions for accessing uncensored websites; and contacting host websites asking them to remove material and/or deplatform/demonetize a targeted individual or group.

Such operations are not “spur of the moment” affairs, but rather involve detailed planning which incorporates human behavioral science. HSOC in particular incorporates the so-called “Hofstede Dimensions” developed by Dutch psychologist Geert Hofstede, which employs cross-cultural ideas of “collectivism” and/or “group think” to influence individuals and/or groups through psychological conditioning and manipulation, into every aspect of its operations.

A critical aspect of employing “Hofstede Dimensions” to their full effect is the ability to develop a detailed behavioral model of the targeted groups and individuals. One of the most effective ways of achieving this is to have an operative insert an alias into a targeted group and/or community, HSOC has demonstrated the ability to carry out the following intelligence collection objectives:

1) Count the number and/or location of views (e.g., for YouTube video) or hits to a website to see if people have accessed the message;

2) Check online and/or collect SIGINT to see if a message has been attended to, understood, accepted, remembered, and changed behavior (e.g., people have spread the message and communicate support for it, people lack trust in the discredited individual/group/regime, people are delayed or deterred from an activity or interaction);

3) Count the number and significance of friends that an alias has, people who have joined the Facebook group, Telegram channel, people who have responded to a blog or post;

4) Analyze the content of communication between a potential source of online human intelligence and the alias to see if he/she is providing useful intelligence;

5) Count the number of times a potential source of online HUMINT initiates communication with the alias;

6)  Check online and/or collect SIGINT to see if people have accessed uncensored material that has been made available to them;

7) Check online to see if hosts who have been asked to delete material have done so;

8) Count the number of websites taken down;

9) Check if an individual or group does allow their site to be hosted (unknowingly) by HSOC or Ukrainian intelligence.

Of course, another way of achieving the same objective would be to have someone on the inside operating in a similar role. This would be the ideal operational purpose behind the SBU using Gonzalo Lira as a controlled asset.

One of the documents released by Edward Snowden was a slide presentation entitled “The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations.” Here the JTRIG openly talks about building so-called “cyber magicians” who “conjure with information” through formal training intended to produce “accredited computer network operators” (ACNO)—modern day information warriors. For those who question the scope and scale of potential information operations that can conceivably be conducted against unwitting targets, the JTRIG training document provides three slides which, when viewed in sequence, demonstrate how “cyber magicians” such as those who would oversee the weaponization of Gonzalo Lira conceive their operational space.

Slide one, ACNO Key Skill Strands

The first slide lists the three “key skill strands” that define the work of an ACNO—Online Human Intelligence, Influence and Information Operations, and Disruption and Computer Network Attacks. Under each skill strand, the slide lists the so-called “magic” techniques and experiments that are used by the operators in their work. Online human intelligence focuses on individual, group, and global collection sets. The influence and information operations focus on four “effects” types: psychology, deception, performance, and media. For disruption and computer network attack activities, an ACNO will emphasize professionalism, elegance, creativity, and intuition.

Slide two, filled-in skill strand chart

The second slide begins to populate the skill strands with actions done to develop the skill into something that relates to an actual discernable activity and objective. Note the role played by “Hofstede Dimensions” in developing skill strands that deal with human behavior. This approach should impress anyone who is dismissive of the value of having a trusted agent operating on the inside of any targeted group, or able to interact with a targeted individual. Gonzalo Lira would have been an invaluable resource in facilitating access to the kinds of information and insights being developed by the involved ACNOs.

Slide three, developed operational thinking

The third slide is perhaps the most damning of all, highlighting as it does the critical importance of having “insiders” in position to facilitate “destructive operational psychology” in support of “planned interventions.”

Again, this is a role ideal for a controlled asset such as Gonzalo Lira.

On April 30, 2022—some two weeks after he was released by the SBU—Lira started up his new YouTube channel, “The Roundtable,” using a “nine-year old Mac” computer—the social media infrastructure he used to rely upon was still in the custody of the SBU. His stated objective was to keep posting material “until I get arrested again.”

Lira’s “Roundtable” forums were a literal petri dish for the creation and collection of invaluable data for the kind of “Hofstede Dimension” analysis carried out by persons conducting information operations. I’ve watched a dozen or more of Lira’s “Roundtable” forums. Lira is an artful conductor, leading his guests through an emotional roller coaster of provocative positions on a variety of issues, making common cause in what is a textbook example of group bonding. Lira assumed the role of the brave dissident, continuing to post critical content with the help of like-minded guests.

Lira’s “Roundtable” podcast provided a platform for alternative media personalities such as Mark Sleboda, Brian Berletic, Alexander Mercouris and Alexander Christoforou from The Duran, Larry Johnson, and a host of others. One thing all these guests have in common, beyond their critical appraisal of Ukraine, is that all believe that Gonzalo Lira cannot be an asset of the SBU. In short, they reject out of hand any notion that the SBU could have recruited him following his arrest back in April 2022.

Mark Sleboda found the notion of Lira having been turned by the SBU “baseless, absurd, and puerile slander.” Brian Bertelic, Alexander Christoforou, and Alexander Mercouris’ all found the notion of Gonzalo Lira being recruited—or even recruitable—by the SBU “crazy.” Frankly speaking, I don’t take too much umbrage at their objections—none of them are intelligence professionals (although Alexander Mercouris, as a former senior barrister, should be well-acquainted with the concept of Police Confidential Informants).

Larry Johnson, however, is an intelligent professional. He has called my contention that Lira is an SBU asset “utter nonsense.” According to Johnson, “No CIA case officer in their right mind would sign up someone like Gonzalo for several reasons. First, he is an American citizen. CIA is prohibited from recruiting US citizens as intelligence assets. Second, Gonzalo’s commentary, analysis and hosted roundtables did not in any way advance a US Government position. Just the opposite — he was (and is) a strong critic.”

This line of thinking is nonsensical. First and foremost, there is no discussion of Lira being recruited by the CIA—that entire argument is a red herring. Second, it is Lira’s “commentary, analysis and hosted roundtables” which make him the ideal candidate for recruitment by the SBU. The JTRIG, in outlining its approach to conducting information operations, emphasized the importance of creating aliases for the purpose of infiltrating online forums such as Lira’s “Roundtable.” With Lira, the need to create an alias was eliminated—the SBU was now, literally, running the show.

All Lira had to do was what he always did—guide a discussion involving like-minded people. The SBU then could pick the topics, have Lira ask some leading questions, stroke some egos, emphasize certain points while downplaying others, and the “Roundtable” became a laboratory for human behavior ideal for the collection of data suitable for “Hofstede Dimension” analysis.

As Larry knows only too well, this kind of recruitment occurs all the time in the intelligence business. The way the CIA and MI-6 avoid the pitfalls associated with unpredictable characters like Gonzalo Lira is to have a partner intelligence service do the actual recruiting and running of an asset, while the CIA and MI-6 monitor and advise.

When I was with UNSCOM, I was involved in several human recruitments of this nature. Perhaps the most relevant was the recruitment of a Romanian aeronautical engineer who was trying to sell surface-to-surface missile production equipment to Iraq in violation of Security Council sanctions.

The British and Israeli intelligence services were both monitoring the preparations being made by Iraq to send a delegation to Romania. Based upon this information, the Romanian aeronautical engineer—who had been engaged in numerous illicit activities involving theft of government property and black-market sales of sensitive military technology—was selected as the best candidate for recruitment. After detailed planning on the part of all parties to this effort, a concept of operations was developed, and a timeline of action created.

The Romanian engineer was confronted by Romanian security officers with evidence of his illegal activities and given the option of going to jail or working for the Romanian intelligence service. By controlling the engineer, MI-6, through the Romanians, was able to manage every aspect of the meetings between the Iraqis and Romanians, including where the meeting would take place (so it could be monitored with video and audio recordings), and when it would take place. By turning the Romanian engineer, into a police confidential informant, MI-6 was able to shape the visit of the Iraqi delegation to conform with the timeline of desired outcomes all the while collecting all the desired intelligence necessary to achieve the overall operational objectives.

Diagram showing how tension can be used to cause groups to self-destruct.

By controlling Gonzalo Lira, the SBU was able to do the same thing. The best example of how this is done, and for what purpose, can be found in one of the JTRIG training slides. One of the best “events” that a side conducting information operations can arrange is to have opposing groups engage in self-destructive behavior. To accomplish this, the SBU would need to be able to identify the factors that push a group together, and those which pull a group apart. Then the SBU would need to create tension by setting members against members using fracture points in the structure of the group that had been identified during the intelligence collection phase of the effort.

Based upon this model, one might reasonably conclude that the current tension between myself and like-minded persons in the alternative media universe, and Larry Johnson, Brian Bertelic, The Duran, and others, regarding whether or not Gonzalo Lira was an SBU asset was, in fact, a successful information operation “event” planned by the SBU to drive a wedge between like-minded individuals who were of a like mind when it comes to Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine.

It was an event which began back in June 2022, when Gonzalo Lira published a video on YouTube in which he attacked me personally. It was an interesting video, one which seemed derived from the kind of behavioral science that drives the JTRIG and SBU methodologies regarding human network disruption. Lira pushed every button imaginable, clearly trying to trigger a response from me. While I was not immune to his attacks, I quickly recognized that Lira had fallen under the control of the SBU, and publicly called him out as such.

In retrospect, my reaction was predictable—like Pavlov’s Dog, I responded to appropriate stimuli. The split between myself and Lira, which continues to this day, appears to be the goal of an SBU information operation “event” on the grounds that anything which weakens the bonds of cooperation between members of the alternative media community can only be seen as a good thing by the SBU.

People often point out that Gonzalo Lira has not been found guilty of any wrongdoing by a system of reputable justice, and as such should not be condemned of a crime he may not have committed. But this ignores the reality that we are at war. If Gonzalo Lira’s behavior raises red flags—and no rational person can look at the details surrounding Lira’s April 2022 “catch and release” escapade without their being significant questions—then as combatants in this conflict, my fellow alternative media members and I would do well to treat all interaction with Mr. Lira—past, present, and future—with extreme caution.

At a minimum, the Gonzalo Lira saga has demonstrated that the alternative media community has great uncertainty about who Mr. Lira is, and where his allegiance ultimately falls. We have been blinded by our own egos, which benefited from Mr. Lira’s attention, which means in many ways we do not even know ourselves. Unless we collectively become wise to the reality of the situation, we are on a path toward losing the information war which, in our case, means the end of free and critical speech and thought.

I have been honest and open about my feelings regarding Gonzalo Lira. I also recognize that my actions were probably incited by Lira, in collaboration with the SBU, to achieve this very result. But at least I am willing to confront this matter straight on, respectful of both the facts and the circumstances.

Who among my critics can honestly say the same thing?

We are at war.

When viewed in this light, Gonzalo Lira is not a simple wayward US citizen with misplaced notions of protected speech in a hostile country which operates outside of the protections afforded by the US Constitution, but rather a collaborator trying to bring harm to our collective embrace of fact-based truth.

We are at war.

“Know the enemy and know yourself,” Sun Tzu wrote, lest you “fear the result of a hundred battles.” However, “If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

It is high time for the alternative media collective to start learning.

About themselves.

About their enemies.

Otherwise, we will fail in our mission of providing an alternative to the mainstream narrative.

We are at war.

Start acting like it.

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Later during a televised question-and-answer session, Putin declared that “what was called Novorossiya back in tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet Government. Why? Who knows? They were won by Potemkin and Catherine the Great in a series of well-known wars. The center of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.”

Novorossiya isn’t just a construct of Vladimir Putin’s imagination, but rather a notion drawn from historic fact that resonated with the people who populated the territories it encompassed. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an abortive effort by pro-Russia citizens of the new Ukrainian state to restore Novorossiya as an independent region. 

While this effort failed, the concept of a greater Novorossiya confederation was revived in May 2014 by the newly proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. But this effort, too, was short-lived, being put on ice in 2015. This, however, did not mean the death of the idea of Novorossiya. On February 21, 2022, Putin delivered a lengthy address to the Russian nation on the eve of his decision to send Russian troops into Ukraine as part of what he termed a Special Military Operation. Those who watched Tucker Carlson’s February 9, 2024, interview with Putin would have been struck by the similarity between the two presentations.

While he did not make a direct reference to Novorossiya, the president did outline fundamental historic and cultural linkages which serve as the foundation for any discussion about the viability and legitimacy of Novorossiya in the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

“I would like to emphasize,” Putin said, “once again that Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us. It is an integral part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space. It is our friends, our relatives, not only colleagues, friends, and former work colleagues, but also our relatives and close family members. Since the oldest times,” Putin continued, “the inhabitants of the south-western historical territories of ancient Russia have called themselves Russians and Orthodox Christians. It was the same in the 17th century, when a part of these territories [i.e., Novorossiya] was reunited with the Russian state, and even after that.”

The Russian president set forth his contention that the modern state of Ukraine was an invention of Vladimir Lenin, the founding father of the Soviet Union. “Soviet Ukraine is the result of the Bolsheviks’ policy,” Putin stated, “and can be rightfully called ‘Vladimir Lenin’s Ukraine’. He was its creator and architect. This is fully and comprehensively corroborated by archival documents.”

Putin went on to issue a threat which, when seen in the context of the present, proved ominously prescient. “And today the ’grateful progeny’ has overturned monuments to Lenin in Ukraine. They call it decommunization. You want decommunization? Very well, this suits us just fine. But why stop halfway? We are ready to show what real decommunizations would mean for Ukraine.”

In September 2022 Putin followed through on this, ordering referendums in four territories (Kherson and Zaporozhye, and the newly independent Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics) to determine whether the populations residing there wished to join the Russian Federation. All four did so. Putin has since then referred to these new Russian territories as Novorossiya, perhaps nowhere more poignantly that in June 2023, when he praised the Russian soldiers “who fought and gave their lives to Novorossiya and for the unity of the Russian world.”

The story of those who fought and gave their lives to Novorossiya is one that I have wanted to tell for some time now. I have borne witness here in the United States to the extremely one-sided coverage of the military aspects of Russia’s military operation. Like many of my fellow analysts, I had to undertake the extremely difficult task of trying to parse out fact from an overwhelmingly fictional narrative. Nor was I helped in any way in this regard by the Russian side, which was parsimonious in the release of information that reflected its side of reality.

In preparing for my December 2023 visit to Russia, I had hoped to be able to visit the four new Russian territories to see for myself what the truth was when it came to the fighting between Russia and Ukraine. I also wanted to interview the Russian military and civilian leadership to get a broader perspective of the conflict. I had reached out to the Russian Foreign and Defense ministries through the Russian Embassy in the US, bending the ear of both the Ambassador, Anatoly Antonov, and the Defense Attache, Major-General Evgeny Bobkin, about my plans.

While both men supported my project and wrote recommendations back to their respective ministries in this regard, the Russian Defense Ministry, which had the final say over what happened in the four new territories, vetoed the idea. This veto was not because they didn’t like the idea of me writing an in-depth analysis of the conflict from the Russian perspective, but rather that the project as I outlined it, which would have required sustained access to frontline units and personnel, was deemed too dangerous. In short, the Russian Defense Ministry did not relish the idea of me being killed on its watch.

Under normal circumstances, I would have backed off. I had no desire to create any difficulty with the Russian government, and I was always cognizant of the reality that I was a guest in the country.

The last thing I wanted to be was a “war tourist,” where I put myself and others at risk for purely personal reasons. But I also felt strongly that if I were going to continue to provide so-called “expert analysis” about the military operation and the geopolitical realities of Novorossiya and Crimea, then I needed to see these places firsthand. I strongly believed that I had a professional obligation to see the new territories. Fortunately for me, Aleksandr Zyryanov, a Crimea native and director general of the Novosibirsk Region Development Corporation, agreed.

It wasn’t going to be easy.

We first tried to enter the new territories via Donetsk, driving west out of Rostov-on-Don. However, when we arrived at the checkpoint, we were told that the Ministry of Defense had not cleared us for entry. Not willing to take no for an answer, Aleksandr drove south, towards Krasnodar, and then – after making some phone calls – across the Crimean Bridge into Crimea. Once it became clear that we were planning on entering the new territories from Crimea, the Ministry of Defense yielded, granting permission for me to visit the four new Russian territories under one non-negotiable condition – I was not to go anywhere near the frontlines.

We left Feodosia early on the morning of January 15, 2024. At Dzhankoy, in northern Crimea, we took highway 18 north toward the Tup-Dzhankoy Peninsula and the Chongar Strait, which separates the Sivash lagoon system that forms the border between Crimea and the mainland into eastern and western portions. It was here that Red Army forces, on the night of November 12, 1920, broke through the defenses of the White Army of General Wrangel, leading to the capture of the Crimean Peninsula by Soviet forces. And it was also here that the Russian Army, on February 24, 2022, crossed into the Kherson Region from Crimea.

The Chongar Bridge is one of three highway crossings that connect Crimea with Kherson. It has been struck twice by Ukrainian forces seeking to disrupt Russian supply lines, once, in June 2023, when it was hit by British-made Storm Shadow missiles, and once again that August when it was hit by French-made SCALP missiles (a variant of the Storm Shadow.) In both instances, the bridge was temporarily shut down for repairs, evidence of which was clearly visible as we made our way across, and on to the Chongar checkpoint, where we were cleared by Russian soldiers for entry into the Kherson Region.

At the checkpoint we picked up a vehicle carrying a bodyguard detachment from the reconnaissance company of the Sparta Battalion, a veteran military formation whose roots date back to the very beginning of the Donbass revolt against the Ukrainian nationalists who seized power in Kiev during the February 2014 Maidan coup. They would be our escort through the Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions – even though we were going to give the frontlines a wide berth, Ukrainian “deep reconnaissance groups”, or DRGs, were known to target traffic along the M18 highway. Aleksandr was driving an armored Chevrolet Suburban, and the Sparta detachment had their own armored SUV. If we were to come under attack, our response would be to try and drive through the ambush. If that failed, then the Sparta boys would have to go to work.

Our first destination was the city of Genichesk, a port city along the Sea of Azov. Genichesk is the capital of the Genichesk District of the Kherson Region and, since November 9, 2022, when Russian forces withdrew from the city of Kherson, it has served as the temporary capital of the region. Aleksandr had been on his phone since morning, and his efforts had paid off – I was scheduled to meet with Vladimir Saldo, the local Governor.

RT

Genichesk is – literally – off the beaten path. When we reached the town of Novoalekseyevka, we got off the M18 highway and headed east along a two-lane road that took us toward the Sea of Azov. There were armed checkpoints all along the route, but the Sparta bodyguards were able to get us waved through without any issues. But the effect of these checkpoints was chilling – there was no doubt that one was in a region at war.

To call Genichesk a ghost town would be misleading – it is populated, and the evidence of civilian life is everywhere you look. The problem was, there didn’t seem to be enough people present. The city, like the region, is in a general state of decay, a holdover from the neglect it had suffered at the hands of a Ukrainian government that largely ignored territories that had, since 2004, voted in favor of the Party of Regions, the party of former President Viktor Yanukovich, who was ousted in the February 2014 Maidan coup. Nearly two years of war had likewise contributed to the atmosphere of societal neglect, an impression which was magnified by the weather – overcast, cold, with a light sleet blowing in off the water.

As we made our way into the building where the government of the Kherson Region had established its temporary offices, I couldn’t help but notice a statue of Lenin in the courtyard. Ukrainian nationalists had taken it down in July 2015, but the citizens of Genichesk had reinstalled it in April 2022, once the Russians had taken control of the city. Given Putin’s feeling about the role Lenin played in creating Ukraine, I found both the presence of this monument, and the role of the Russian citizens of Genichesk in restoring it, curiously ironic.

Vladimir Saldo is a man imbued with enthusiasm for his work. A civil engineer by profession, with a PhD in economics, Saldo had served in senior management positions in the “Khersonbud” Project and Construction Company before moving on into politics, serving on the Kherson City Council, the Kherson Regional Administration, and two terms as the mayor of the city of Kherson. Saldo, as a member of the Party of Regions, moved to the opposition and was effectively subjected to political ostracism in 2014, when the Ukrainian nationalists who had seized power all but forced it out of politics.

Aleksandr and I had the pleasure of meeting with Saldo in his office in the government building in downtown Genichesk. We talked about a wide range of issues, including his own path from a Ukrainian construction specialist to his current position as the governor of Kherson Oblast.

We talked about the war.

But Saldo’s passion was the economy, and how he could help revive the civilian economy of Kherson in a manner that best served the interests of its diminished population. On the eve of the military operation, back in early 2022, the population of the Kherson Region stood at just over a million, of which some 280,000 were residing in the city of Kherson. By November 2022, following the withdrawal of Russian forces from the right bank of the Dnieper River – including the city of Kherson – the population of the region had fallen below 400,000 and, with dismal economic prospects, the numbers kept falling. Many of those who left were Ukrainians who did not want to live under Russian rule. But others were Russians and Ukrainians who felt that they had no future in the war-torn region, and as such sought their fortunes elsewhere in Russia.

“My job is to give the people of Kherson hope for a better future,” Saldo told me. “And the time for this to happen is now, not when the war ends.”

Restoration of Kherson’s once vibrant agricultural sector is a top priority, and Saldo has personally taken the lead in signing agreements for the provision of Kherson produce to Moscow supermarkets. Saldo has also turned the region into a special economic zone, where potential investors and entrepreneurs can receive preferential loans and financial support, as well as organizational and legal assistance for businesses willing to open shop there.

The man responsible for making this vision a reality is Mikhail Panchenko, the Director of the Kherson Region Industry Development Fund. I met Mikhail in a restaurant located across the street from the governmental building which Saldo called home. Mikhail had come to Kherson in the summer of 2022, leaving a prominent position in Moscow in the process. “The Russian government was interested in rebuilding Kherson,” Mikhail told me, “and established the Industry Development Fund as a way of attracting businesses to the region.” Mikhail, who was born in 1968, was too old to enlist in the military. “When the opportunity came to direct the Industry Development Fund, I jumped at it as a way to do my patriotic duty.”

The first year of the fund’s operation saw Mikhail hand out 300 million rubles (almost $3.3 million at the current rate) in loans and grants (some of which was used to open the very restaurant where we were meeting.) The second year saw the allotment grow to some 700 million rubles. One of the biggest projects was the opening of a concrete production line capable of producing 60 cubic meters of concrete per hour. Mikhail took Alexander and me on a tour of the plant, which had grown to three production lines generating some 180 cubic meters of concrete an hour. Mikhail had just approved funding for an additional four production lines, for a total concrete production rate of 420 cubic meters per hour.

“That’s a lot of concrete,” I remarked to Mikhail.

“We are making good use of it,” he replied. “We are rebuilding schools, hospitals, and government buildings that had been neglected over the years. Revitalizing the basic infrastructure a society needs if it is to nurture a growing population.”

The problem Mikhail faces, however, is that most of the population growth being experienced in Kherson today comes from the military. The war can’t last forever, Mikhail noted. “Someday the army will leave, and we will need civilians. Right now, the people who left are not returning, and we’re having a hard time attracting newcomers. But we will keep building in anticipation of a time when the population of the Kherson region will grow from an impetus other than war. And for that,” he said, a twinkle in his eye, “we need concrete!”

I thought long and hard about the words of Vladimir Saldo and Panchenko as Aleksandr drove back onto the M18 highway, heading northeast, toward Donetsk. The reconstruction efforts being undertaken are impressive. But the number that kept coming to mind was the precipitous decline in the population – more than 60% of the pre-war population has left the Kherson region since the Russian military operation began.

According to statistics provided by the Russian Central Election Commission, some 571,000 voters took part in the referendum on joining Russia that was held in late September 2022. A little over 497,000, or some 87%, voted in favor, while slightly more than 68,800, or 12%, voted against. The turnout was almost 77%.

hese numbers, if accurate, implied that there was a population of over 740,000 eligible voters at the time of the election. While the loss of the city of Kherson in November 2022 could account for a significant source of the population drop that took place between September 2022 and the time of my visit in January 2024, it could not account for all of it.

The Russian population of Kherson in 2022 stood at approximately 20%, or around 200,000. One can safely say that the number of Russians who fled west to Kiev following the start of the military operation amounts to a negligible figure. If one assumes that the Russian population of the Kherson Region remained relatively stable, then most of the population decline came from the Ukrainian population.

While Saldo did not admit to such, the Governor of the neighboring Zaporozhya Region, Yevgeny Balitsky, has acknowledged that many Ukrainian families deemed by the authorities to be anti-Russian were deported following the initiation of the military operation (Russians accounted for a little more than 25% of the pre-conflict Zaporozhye population.) Many others fled to Russia to escape the deprivations of war.

Evidence of the war was everywhere to be seen. While the conflict in Kherson has stabilized along a line defined by the Dnieper River, Zaporozhye is very much a frontline region. Indeed, the main direction of attack of the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive was from the Zaporozhye region village of Rabotino, toward the town of Tokmak, and on towards the temporary regional capital of Melitopol (the city of Zaporozhye has remained under Ukrainian control throughout the conflict to date.)

I had petitioned to visit the frontlines near Rabotino but had been denied by the Russian Ministry of Defense. So, too, was my request to visit units deployed in the vicinity of Tokmak – too close to the front. The closest I would get would be the city of Melitopol, the ultimate objective of the Ukrainian counterattack. We drove past fields filled with the concrete “dragon’s teeth” and antitank ditches that marked the final layer of defenses that constituted the “Surovikin Line,” named after the Russian General, Sergey Surovikin, who had commanded the forces when the defenses were put in place.

The Ukrainians had hoped to reach the city of Melitopol in a matter of days once their attack began; they never breached the first line of defense situated to the southeast of Rabotino.

Melitopol, however, is not immune to the horrors of war, with Ukrainian artillery and rockets targeting it often to disrupt Russian military logistics. I kept this in mind as we drove through the streets of the city, past military checkpoints, and roving patrols. I was struck by the fact that the civilians I saw were going about their business, seemingly oblivious to the everyday reality of war that existed around them.

As was the case in Kherson, the entirety of the Zaporozhye Region seemed strangely depopulated, as if one were driving through the French capital of Paris in August, when half the city is away on vacation. I had hoped to be able to talk with Balitsky about the reduced population and other questions I had about life in the region during wartime, but this time Aleksandr’s phone could not produce the desired result – Balitsky was away from the region and unavailable.

If he had been available, I would have asked him the same question I had put to Saldo earlier in the day: given that Putin was apparently willing to return the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions to Ukraine as part of the peace deal negotiated in March 2022, how does the population of his region feel about being part of Russia today? Are they convinced that Russia is, in fact, there to stay?  Do they feel like they are a genuine part of the Novorossiya that Putin speaks about?

Saldo had talked in depth about the transition from being occupied by Russian forces, which lasted until April-May 2022 (about the time that Ukraine backed out of the ceasefire agreement), to being administered by Moscow. “There never was a doubt in my mind, or anyone else’s, that Kherson was historically a part of Russia,” Saldo said, “or that, once Russian troops arrived, that we would forever be Russian again.”

But the declining population, and the admission of forced deportations on the part of Balitsky, suggests that there was a significant part of the population that had, in fact, taken umbrage at such a future.

I would have liked to hear what Balitsky had to say about this question.

Reality, however, doesn’t deal with hypotheticals, and the present reality is that both Kherson and Zaporozhye are today part of the Russian Federation, and that both regions are populated by people who had made the decision to remain there as citizens of Russia. We will never know what the fate of these two territories would have been had the Ukrainian government honored the ceasefire agreement negotiated in March 2022. What we do know is that today both Kherson and Zaporozhye are part of the “New Territories” – Novorossiya.

Russia will for some time find its acquisition of the “new territories” challenged by nations who question the legitimacy of Russia’s military occupation and subsequent absorption of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions into the Russian Federation. The reticence of foreigners to recognize these regions as being part of Russia, however, is the least of Russia’s problems. As was the case with Crimea, the Russian government will proceed irrespective of any international opposition.

The real challenge facing Russia is to convince Russians that the new territories are as integral to the Russian motherland as Crimea, a region reabsorbed by Russia in 2014 which has seen its economic fortunes and its population grow over the past decade. The diminished demographics of Kherson and Zaporozhye represent a litmus test of sorts for the Russian government, and for the governments of both Kherson and Zaporozhye. If the populations of these regions cannot regenerate, then these regions will wither on the vine. If, however, these new Russian lands can be transformed into places where Russians can envision themselves raising families in an environment free from want and fear, then Novorossiya will flourish.

Novorossiya is a reality, and the people who live there are citizens by choice more than circumstances. They are well served by men like Saldo and Balitsky, who are dedicated to the giant task of making these regions part of the Russian Motherland in actuality, not just in name.

Behind Saldo and Balitsky are men like Panchenko, people who left an easy life in Moscow or some other Russian city to come to the “New Territories” not for the purpose of seeking their fortunes, but rather to improve the lives of the new Russian citizens of Novorossiya.

For this to happen, Russia must emerge victorious in its struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists ensconced in Kiev, and their Western allies. Thanks to the sacrifices of the Russian military, this victory is in the process of being accomplished.

Then the real test begins – turning Novorossiya into a place Russians will want to call home.

 

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Ukraine SitRep: Retreat Continues For Lack Of Defense Lines

 

On February 17, after Ukrainian units in Avdeevka had started to leave their position, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Syrski, announced a retreat to new defense lines:

"Based on the operational situation around Avdiivka, in order to avoid encirclement and preserve the lives and health of the military, I decided to withdraw our units from the city and move to defense on more favorable lines," Syrskyi said.

He emphasized that Ukrainian soldiers had fulfilled their duty with dignity, did their best to destroy the best Russian military units and inflicted significant losses in manpower and equipment on the enemy.

"The lives of servicemen are the highest value. We will take back Avdiivka anyway," the Chief added.

As some had already predicted it turned out that the "more favorable lines" Syrski promoted did not exist.

On February 17, the same day Syrski announced the retreat, Strana already reported on the lack of new defense lines (machine translation):

Ukrainian photographers Konstantin and Vlada Liberov, who document the war, wonder around which Ukrainian city, next after Avdiivka, the Russians will try to push through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

They report this in their Instagram.

"So what is the next "fortetsia" - Pokrovsk? Or just Konstantinovka?", - write Liberov, criticizing the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine because of the lack of a second line of defense in Avdiivka.

"Where is the second line of defense? If you use the Deepstate map, "claws" around the city began to form almost a year ago. It certainly wasn't a surprise. So where's the second line of defense?" The Liberovs ask themselves.

"While the military was waiting for weapons for the Zaporozhye counteroffensive, the enemy passed through the fields, concreted trenches, built entire underground cities… Why didn't we do the same in Avdiivka? Moreover, a blind defense, the purpose of which is to deplete the enemy's forces, is like our official strategy.

Others confirmed the observation (machine translation):

West of Avdiivka, no significant defense line has been built for Ukrainian troops, and the Russian army continues to advance.

This was announced by the editor-in-chief of Censor, Yuri Butusov, following his trip to this area.

"There are no words. Gap: here in Kiev, the supreme commander-in-chief says one thing, but at the front something completely different is happening. I want to say that no field lines of fortifications have been built beyond Avdiivka so far. I saw Russian drones attacking our soldiers in their burrows in the middle of a field, " Butusov said.

According to him, no conclusions are drawn from previous failures.

"If the government can't find builders to build at least basic rear lines of defense, if they can't find engineers to maintain modern equipment, drones, sensors, communications, if they can't find workers and technologists to produce ammunition, then there will never be enough attack aircraft," the journalist added.

The government claimed to have allocated money to local authorities for building defense lines. But such money always seem to drain away before the first fortification gets finished.

A lack of serious organization and incompetence add to the picture (machine translation):

In the absence of fortified trenches in the east of the country, the engineering services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are to blame.

This was stated in the social network X military engineer with the nickname Corsair.

As stated in a series of his posts, the heads of engineering services of brigades "do not know how to plan ahead and do not submit requests on time."

"When I arrive at a place, I have neither a map nor a proper justification. As a rule, they say: "We need to dig from that stump to planting." But that's not how it works. The defense should be solid, " Korsar wrote.

According to him, engineers do not have wood and concrete either, because "the brigades do not have the willpower to insist on this, and the AHS (operational-tactical group - Ed. ) do not have money."

For construction equipment, you need to sign contracts with businesses, but no one does this.

Since the loss of Avdeevka the Ukrainian forces had to fall back again and again. There are no natural barriers that could be used for defenses and there is no equipment and material to build defense lines across bare land.

Today even the New York Times took note of this:

Surprisingly Weak Ukrainian Defenses Help Russian Advance (archived) - New York Times, Mar 2 2024

Russian forces continue to make small but rapid gains outside of the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka, attributable in part to dwindling Ukrainian ammunition and declining Western aid.

But there’s another reason the Kremlin’s troops are advancing in the area: poor Ukrainian defenses.

Sparse, rudimentary trench lines populate the area west of Avdiivka that Ukraine is trying to defend, according to a Times review of imagery by Planet Labs, a commercial satellite company. These trench lines lack many of the additional fortifications that could help slow Russian tanks and help defend major roads and important terrain.

Avdiivka became the site of a fierce standoff over the last nine months, emerging as one of the bloodiest battles of the war. When Russia captured the city on Feb. 17, its first major gain since last May, the Ukrainian Army claimed it had secured defensive lines outside the city.

But Russian troops have captured three villages to the west of Avdiivka in the span of a week, and they are contesting at least one other.

Avdeevka Feb 17 2024
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Avdeevka Mar 2 2024
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The Ukraine friendly Live UA map from where the above maps were copied is not fully up to date. The town Orlivka, still shown as Ukrainian, is already in Russian hands.

The next geographic feature that might be useful for defense is the north-to-south river and reservoir line 12 kilometer west of Orlivka. Nothing in between was prepared for a serious defense. It can not be held against any serious attacker:

Ukrainian commanders have had ample time to prepare defenses outside Avdiivka. The area has been under attack since 2014, and Ukraine has had a tenuous hold on it since Russia launched its full-scale invasion two years ago.

But the Ukrainian defenses outside Avdiivka show rudimentary earthen fortifications, often with a connecting trench for infantry troops to reach firing positions closest to the enemy, but little else.

But instead acknowledging that and instead of retreating to that river line the Ukrainian command is again throwing reserves into the already crumbling defenses.

Mr. Hrabskyi said Russia was currently preventing Ukrainian troops from shoring up their defenses by relentlessly bombarding them, including with powerful glide bombs carrying hundreds of tons of explosives that can smash through even well-prepared fortifications.

“The quality of these defensive lines cannot be good enough to resist massive bulldozer tactics by the Russian forces,” Mr. Hrabskyi said.

The current political uproar in Europe and the U.S. about the war in Ukraine is an acknowledgment of the fact that Russia is certain to win this fight. I do not expect any serious consequences coming from it.

It will simply take a few more weeks of discussions until resignation sets in.

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Scott Ritter: How the US misleads the world about its involvement in Yemen
While Washington maintains that the strikes on Houthi installations are defensive and fully legal, neither is the case

“The strikes in Yemen were necessary, proportionate, and consistent with international law.” With this statement, the United States delegate to the United Nations defended the joint US-UK military strikes against targets affiliated with the Houthi militia undertaken on the night of January 12, 2024.

The irony of this statement is that it was made before a body, the United Nations Security Council, which had not authorized any such action, thereby eliminating any claim to legitimacy that could possibly be made by the US.

The Charter of the UN specifies two conditions under international law in which military force can be used. One is in the conduct of legitimate self-defense as articulated in Article 51 of the Charter. The other is in accordance with the authority granted by the UN Security Council through a resolution passed under Chapter VII of the Charter.

British Foreign Minister David Cameron cited the UN Security Council in his justification of the UK’s involvement in the attacks on Yemen, claiming that the Council had “made clear” that the “Houthi must halt attacks in the Red Sea.”

While the Security Council had issued a resolution demanding that the Houthi cease their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, this resolution was not passed under Chapter VII, and therefore neither the US nor the UK had any authority under international law to carry out their attacks on Yemen.

Both the US and UK invoked the notion of self-defense in their attacks on Yemen, thereby indirectly alluding to a possible cognizable action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. US President Joe Biden justified the US military attack on Houthi militia forces in Yemen in a statement released shortly after the strikes ended. “I ordered this military action,” he declared, “in accordance with my responsibility to protect Americans at home and abroad.” 

The main problem with this argument is that the Houthis had not attacked Americans, either at home or abroad. To the extent that US forces had previously engaged weapons fired by the Houthis, they had done so to shield non-American assets – either the State of Israel or international shipping – from Houthi attack. Under no circumstances could the US argue that it had been attacked by the Houthis.

The US attacks, Biden asserted, “were carried out to deter and weaken the Houthi ability to launch future attacks.”

This language suggests that the US was seeking to eliminate an imminent threat to commercial maritime operations in international shipping lanes. To comply with the requirements of international law regarding collective self-defense – the only possible argument for legitimacy since the US itself had not been attacked – the US would need to demonstrate that it was part of a collective of nation states that were either under attack by the Houthis or were threatened with imminent attack of a nature that precluded seeking Security Council intervention. 

In late December 2023, the US had, together with several other nations, gathered military forces in what was known as Operation Prosperity Guardian to deter Houthi attacks on maritime shipping that had been taking place since November 19, 2023.

However, the US subsequently undermined any case it could possibly have made that its actions were consistent with international law, namely that they were an act of collective pre-emptive self-defense done in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

US Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for operations in the Middle East, issued a press release shortly after Washington launched a second attack against a Houthi radar installation that it claims was involved in targeting shipping in the Red Sea.

The statement claimed the attack on the Houthi radar installation was a “follow-on action” of the strikes carried out on January 12, and had “no association with and are separate from Operation Prosperity Guardian, a defensive coalition of over 20 countries operating in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden.”

By distancing itself from Operation Prosperity Guardian, the US has fatally undermined any notion of pre-emptive collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, highlighting the unilateral, and inherently illegal, nature of its military attacks on Yemen.

 

 

Scott RITTER

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